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On the Strength of Children’s Right to Bodily Integrity:  
The Case of Circumcision 
JOSEPH MAZOR 
ABSTRACT  This article considers the question of how much weight the 
infringement of children’s right to bodily integrity should be given compared with 
competing considerations.  It utilizes the example of circumcision to explore this 
question, taking as given this practice’s opponents’ view of circumcision’s 
harmfulness.  The article argues that the child’s claim against being subjected to 
(presumably harmful) circumcision is neither a mere interest nor a right so strong 
that it trumps all competing interests.  Instead, it is a right of moderate strength.  
Indeed, even the aggregate strength of children’s rights against the practice of 
(presumably harmful) circumcision as a whole is not so weighty so as to always 
trump competing interests.  The harms are not sufficiently serious to justify such a 
status.  And the expressive wrongs associated with non-negligently benevolent 
harming are much less serious than those associated with intentional harming.  The 
debate over banning circumcision thus cannot be conducted only in terms of 
competing rights.  Competing interests, such as those that would be set back by the 
departure of religious citizens, should be considered as well and might plausibly 
justify allowing even a rights-infringing practice to continue. 
 
Introduction 
In 2013, the Nordic Ombudsmen for Children issued a statement calling for a 
ban on male child circumcision.  In their statement, the ombudsmen appealed to the 
moral priority of children’s rights to bodily integrity over competing considerations, 
such as parental rights.1  However, this priority was merely asserted rather than 
argued for.  Moreover, several important competing considerations were ignored.  For 
example, a ban on circumcision could well cause a sizeable number of religious 
citizens (e.g., Orthodox Jews) to leave the Nordic states.2  Might a government that 
viewed circumcision as a rights-infringement nevertheless allow the practice to 
continue on the basis of these competing considerations?   
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Answering this question requires evaluating the strength of children’s rights to 
bodily integrity – how much weight the infringement of these rights should be granted 
relative to competing moral values.  This is the issue I wish to consider in this article. 
Some scholars hold that the child’s right to bodily integrity is what Ronald 
Dworkin calls a right-as-trump.3  While an infringement of a right of this strength can 
sometimes be justified by the need to respect competing rights, a right-as-trump is 
sufficiently strong to always outweigh the moral value of competing interests.  If a 
child has a right-as-trump against being circumcised, then the mere interests set back 
by the departure of religious citizens will never justify allowing this practice to 
continue. 
However, I shall argue in this article that, even if we take circumcision’s 
opponents’ positions regarding the practice’s harms as given, and even if we consider 
the aggregate strength of children’s rights against the practice of circumcision as a 
whole, this strength does not rise to an interest-trumping level for two reasons.  First, 
the level of harm is insufficiently severe to justify a trump status.  Second (and more 
controversially), the non-negligently benevolent motives of the agents who authorize 
circumcision make children’s rights against this practice weaker than they would be in 
the case of malevolent harms of similar magnitude.   
 
1. Specifying the Type of Bodily Encroachment 
While general talk of a child’s right to bodily integrity is sometimes useful, 
when it comes to the question of strength, the child’s moral claim to bodily integrity 
cannot be plausibly viewed monolithically. The child’s moral claim against being 
bumped into accidentally, for example, is clearly much weaker than her claim against 
having her organs forcibly removed and sold for profit.  Any exploration of the 
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strength of the child’s moral claim to bodily integrity therefore requires carefully 
specifying the type of encroachment under consideration. 
The encroachments on the bodies of pre-autonomous children that I wish to 
consider in this article satisfy two conditions: 
a) The encroachment is moderately harmful for the child in expectation.4 
 
b) The encroachment is authorized by parents who non-negligently believe they 
are acting in their child’s best interests. 
 
My aim in this article is to consider, not only the strength of a single child’s 
claim against a bodily encroachment satisfying conditions a) and b), but also the 
aggregate strength of children’s claims against a social practice constituted by a 
considerable number of such encroachments.  When considering social practices, I 
shall assume that the encroachments that constitute the practice are by and large 
(rather than universally) authorized by non-negligently benevolent parents. 
 
2. Male Infant Circumcision: An Example 
 Since several terms above are vague (e.g., moderately harmful in expectation), 
it is useful to consider a concrete example of the type of encroachment I have in mind.  
The example I shall use is male infant circumcision in the United States, taking as 
given the practice’s opponents’ positions regarding its harms.   
According to opponents of the practice, circumcision causes: 
 Substantial pain to all infants being circumcised, even with local 
anesthetics, and significant pain and discomfort during the 
recovery process.5 
 
 Some reduction in sexual pleasure and sexual functioning in all 
those who are circumcised (due to loss of the foreskin).6 
 
 A variety of other medical and mental health complications in 
some cases, ranging from minor to very serious.7 
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 Death in a miniscule number of cases.8 
 
 Health benefits that are fairly minor and routinely overstated.9 
 
Let us also make the following assumptions friendly to circumcision’s 
opponents: 
 Circumcision sets back the child’s weighty interest in deciding for 
himself once he is autonomous what is to be done with his body. 
 
 The setback to an individual’s interests of being circumcised as an 
infant is no greater than the setback to his interests in being 
circumcised as an adult.10 
 
 ‘Harm’ is defined as a significant setback to a person’s interests 
relative to some morally privileged baseline.   
 
 The non-intervention status quo is the appropriate morally 
privileged baseline in this case.   
 
Given these assumptions, we might say that circumcision is somewhat harmful 
to all boys and is seriously or severely harmful to those subset of the boys for whom 
the procedure’s more serious risks materialize.  From an ex ante perspective and given 
these assumptions, then, it is an encroachment on the child’s body that we might 
characterize as moderately harmful in expectation (MHE).  I will to use the term 
‘MHE circumcision’ in the rest of this article to remind the reader that I am taking the 
practice’s opponents’ assumptions about its harms as given. 
Proponents of male circumcision might object to my use of circumcision as an 
example on the grounds that it is in fact not harmful, but beneficial.  Proponents of 
circumcision contest opponents claims about many of its negative effects (e.g., on 
sexual pleasure).  Moreover, they hold that circumcision offers valuable protections 
against sexually transmitted diseases, penile cancer, and urinary tract infections.11   
In response, I do not deny the plausibility of viewing circumcision as 
beneficial.  However, the example of MHE circumcision is nevertheless useful to 
consider for several reasons.  First, since banning circumcision would likely have a 
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variety of side effects that are generally viewed to be undesirable (e.g., religious 
citizens leaving the state), there is significant practical value in exploring the strength 
of children’s rights against this particular practice.  Second, the debate over this 
practice often becomes mired in empirical controversies.  By arguing (as I will) that 
opponents of circumcision may be overestimating the strength of children’s right 
against this practice even taking their empirical assumptions about the harms of the 
practice as given, it may be possible to make headway in this politically important 
debate.  Finally, many of circumcision’s opponents view this practice as among the 
most harmful interventions in children’s bodies legally permitted in Western liberal 
democracies.  Thus, if the strength of children’s rights against even this practice can 
be shown to fall short of trump status, this may have implications for debates 
surrounding a variety of other legally permitted interventions in children’s bodies 
(e.g., child mole removal).   
Opponents of circumcision, on the other hand, might object to my use of this 
example by disputing the non-negligent benevolence of parents who authorize 
circumcision.  Ungar-Sargon, for example, accuses parents who authorize this 
procedure of using their child’s body as a means to their own ends.12  He points out 
that circumcision is required of the father by Jewish law.13  He also points out that 
many secular parents admit that a key reason for circumcising their son is so that he 
‘looks like’ the father.14  
Ungar-Sargon’s arguments admittedly suggest that circumcision is in the 
interest of many parents who authorize the operation.  However, this is insufficient to 
ground the very serious accusation that parents who authorize the procedure are using 
their children’s bodies as means to their own ends.  After all, it is certainly possible 
that the parents believe that both their ends and their child’s ends would be advanced 
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by the circumcision.  And they may well be motivated substantially by their child’s 
good in addition to their own.  Thus, ascertaining whether the children’s bodies are 
being intentionally used as means to the parents’ ends requires determining whether 
parents view the procedure as being in their child’s interests. 
Religious parents almost surely view circumcision as being beneficial for their 
sons.  After all, the vast majority of religious parents presumably believe that it is in 
their son’s interest to be members of their religious community.  Since circumcision is 
important for membership in many of these communities,15 it would be seen as good 
for the child.  Moreover, only if someone believed in a malevolent, indifferent, or 
capricious god would she believe that God would command or recommend an act that 
is harmful to a child.  Yet both Judaism and Islam view God as benevolent. 
There are also good reasons to believe that secular parents who authorize the 
procedure view it as beneficial for their sons.   First, though many parents who 
authorize circumcision cite the father’s circumcised status as a reason for the 
procedure, they often have multiple reasons for authorizing circumcision, some of 
which seem clearly child-centered (e.g., hygiene).16  Moreover, even the rationale that 
the father is circumcised is not unambiguously father-centered.  After all, a major 
difference between the child’s penis and the penis of his primary male role model that 
cannot be simply explained by the passage of time might generate some significant 
body image issues for the child – or so some parents might reasonably believe.17  
Moreover, some circumcised fathers may feel as though they will not know how to 
advise or care for their sons when it comes to penis-related issues if their son’s penis 
is different from theirs in this important way.18   
Opponents of circumcision may well have a variety of persuasive responses to 
these parental concerns.  But the question here is not whether these concerns are 
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ultimately compelling.  The point instead is that there is a perfectly plausible way of 
interpreting even the parents’ expressed concern for the difference between the father 
and the son’s penis as being based, at least in large part, on a concern with the child’s 
welfare.  Given the love the vast majority of parents feel for their sons, establishing 
that parents are circumcising their sons as a means to their own ends despite (or 
without any regard for) substantial perceived harm to their child would require 
compelling evidence – evidence that Ungar-Sargon does not provide. 
Svoboda and his coauthors challenge the claim that circumcision is authorized 
by non-negligently benevolent parents in a different way – by arguing that many 
parents’ belief that circumcision is in the best interests of their child is negligent.  
They argue that parents must understand all available information about the risks of 
circumcision in order to grant morally appropriate consent for the procedure.19  And 
while the thrust of their criticism is aimed at medical professionals and the 
information they provide to parents in the United States, their argument also implies 
that parents who authorize circumcision solely on the basis of the medical information 
they are currently provided may well be acting negligently. 
However, the standard of knowledgeability that Svoboda and his coauthors 
ask of parents is implausibly demanding.  Circumcision is not some novel medical 
procedure recommended by an acquaintance.  In the United States at least, it is a 
commonplace procedure viewed by respected medical bodies as plausibly having net 
medical benefits.20  Moreover, given most parents’ lack of medical expertise, they are 
not in an epistemic position to evaluate the complex, often conflicting evidence about 
the effects of the practice, even if they took the time to thoroughly research the 
procedure.   It therefore does not seem negligent for parents to rely heavily on the 
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views of well-respected medical bodies or a doctor’s recommendation in authorizing 
the procedure.   
To be sure, these arguments do not establish that all parents who authorize 
circumcision are motivated by non-negligent benevolence.  Some parents may 
authorize this operation primarily to relieve social pressure from religious relatives or 
to protect the father’s body image, despite believing that the circumcision is harmful 
for their child.  Others may negligently fail to take any time whatsoever to find out 
anything about the procedure (e.g., not even skimming the consent form or paying any 
attention to the doctor when she mentions any risks).  However, given the love felt by 
the vast majority of parents for their children, and given the arguments above, it 
seems plausible to hold that circumcisions are by and large motivated by non-
negligently benevolence.  Thus, MHE circumcision is a good example of the type of 
practice that I am interested in here, and I shall use this example in the rest of this 
article. 
 
3. The Strength of Moral Claims: Different Possibilities 
There are many possible views regarding the strength of the child’s claim 
against being subjected to MHE circumcision.  At the most stringent extreme is the 
position that a single child’s claim against being subjected to MHE circumcision is an 
absolute right.21  On this view, no other moral consideration, no matter how weighty, 
could ever justify the MHE circumcision of a single child.  At the other extreme is the 
position that the child’s moral claim against being subjected to MHE circumcision has 
no weight at all.  On this view, even trivial goods would justify the practice of MHE 
circumcision.    
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Although these positions are useful to highlight, no scholar (that I am aware 
of) endorses either of these extreme positions.  The controversial question instead is 
this.  Where between these two extremes lies the strength of the child’s moral claim 
against MHE circumcision? 
It is perhaps unsurprising that many opponents of circumcision defend a 
position that is closer to the more stringent end of the spectrum.  Ungar-Sargon, for 
example, endorses the view that the child’s right against being subjected to MHE 
circumcision is a trump.22  A right-as-trump is not as strong as an absolute right since 
its infringement can be justified by the need to respect other, more morally weighty 
rights.  However, it is sufficiently strong to always outweigh any mere interests.23  So, 
for example, on this view, the interests that would be set back by the departure of 
religious citizens (including the interests of the departing citizens themselves as well 
the interests of remaining citizens who lose friends, colleagues, and community 
members) can be safely ignored in an analysis of the permissibility of MHE 
circumcision (since a setback to these interests can never justify permitting the 
infringement of a right-as-trump).  
An alternative view that lies towards the weaker end of the spectrum of 
possible strengths is that the child’s moral claim against being subjected to MHE 
circumcision is a mere interest.  Some proponents of will-based theories of rights are 
committed to this position (since the child is pre-autonomous).24   
However, there is also an intermediate position between the interest view and 
the right-as-trump view – a position that is often overlooked.25  Namely, we could 
view the child’s claim against being subjected to MHE circumcision as a right, but 
one that is weaker than a trump.  On this view, the child’s moral claim against being 
subjected to MHE circumcision is not itself a mere interest.  However, it is also not 
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sufficiently weighty to necessarily outweigh all competing interests.  We might call a 
moral claim with this level of strength a right-as-priority.  I shall argue in the rest of 
this article in favor of this right-as-priority position.   
   
4. A Right against Substantially Harmful Bodily Encroachments 
I begin my case for the right-as-priority position by arguing that the child’s 
claim against being subjected to encroachments such as MHE circumcision is stronger 
than a mere interest.  There are at least three reasons why this is so.  First, the 
potential harms associated with MHE encroachments, though not of the most serious 
kind, are certainly substantial.  In the case of MHE circumcision, for example, there is 
a risk of death (albeit miniscule).  There is also a significant risk of serious negative 
physical and psychological consequences, at least for a small minority of circumcised 
boys.  Furthermore, there are (we are assuming) significant harms to all children 
subjected to MHE circumcision from the loss of sexual pleasure/functioning as well 
as the pain of the procedure and recovery process.  Finally, the countervailing benefits 
of circumcision are (we are assuming) minor.  It seems implausible to describe a 
child’s claim against being subjected to such substantial net harms and serious risks as 
a mere interest.26 
Second, it is morally relevant that we are considering here an encroachment on 
the body of the child.  As a variety of philosophers have argued, the body should be 
granted special moral protection compared with encroachments on other interests.27  
A person’s body is, after all, tied up in intimate ways with an individual’s personhood 
– with who he or she is.28  In the case of circumcision, this consideration is 
particularly weighty since the penis is an especially intimate body part, one that is 
often tied to a male’s conception of himself as a man.   
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Finally, viewing the child’s claim against MHE circumcision as a mere 
interest might implausibly imply (at least on some views) that the permissibility of 
circumcision can be determined by a simple utilitarian calculus – one that grants 
weight to the interests of individuals besides the child equal to the weight granted to 
the interests of the child in determining what is to be done with the child’s body.  Yet 
it seems implausible to hold that the permissibility of MHE circumcision might turn 
solely on, say, how inexpensive the cast-off foreskins made cosmetics or on how 
many traditionalists in the United States would like the practice to continue.  Holding 
that the child has a right against MHE circumcision precludes these simplistic 
utilitarian approaches. 
 
5. An Insufficient Degree of Harm for Trump Status 
However, accepting that the child has a right against MHE circumcision does 
not imply that it is a right-as-trump.  It could be a right-as-priority – a moral claim not 
subject to a simple calculus of interests but also not so strong as to always outweigh 
all competing interests in society.  Indeed, I shall argue in the next two sections that, 
not only does a single child’s right against MHE circumcision not rise to the level of a 
trump, but even the strength of children’s rights against the practice of MHE 
circumcision as a whole does not rise to an interest-trumping level.   The first reason, 
which will be my focus in this section, is that the expected harms caused by MHE 
circumcision are insufficiently grave to justify an interest-trumping status.   
To explore the relationship between the magnitude of expected harms and the 
strength of rights to bodily integrity, consider the following case: 
Non-Essential Pollution:  Scientists in a society similar in size and 
development to the United States discover that the air pollution caused 
by motorized travel is causing bodily harms to children. 
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The harm caused by the pollution was previously thought to be natural 
and unavoidable.   
 
Assume further that: 
 
 The government can permit essential motorized travel (i.e., 
motorized travel that is necessary for respecting rights such as 
ambulance services and transportation of necessities) without 
causing bodily harm to children.  However, any pollution 
caused by motorized travel above this threshold will 
unavoidably cause the relevant bodily harms. 
 
 Non-essential motorized travel only benefits the adults in the 
society. 
 
 There is no way for society to compensate the children who 
suffer the bodily harms.   
 
The government has only two choices:  Ban all non-essential 
motorized travel or allow this polluting activity and the associated 
bodily harms to children. 
 
Whether the government should permit non-essential motorized travel depends 
on what is meant by ‘non-essential’ and on the degree of harm caused by the resulting 
pollution.  Uncontroversially specifying which types of motorized travel are ‘non-
essential’ requires a full account of rights, and is thus far beyond the scope of this 
article.  However, travel that would need to be curtailed would almost surely include 
the majority of voyages taken for leisure, entertainment, and social purposes as well 
as those used to transport a variety of non-essential consumer goods. 
As for the harms, I wish to consider the following three possibilities: 
i. If continued, the pollution will damage one boy’s foreskin such that he 
must be subjected to MHE circumcision. 
 
ii. If continued, the pollution will damage the foreskins of 50% of 
society’s boys such that they must be subjected to MHE circumcision. 
 
iii. If continued, the pollution will cause the death of 20% of society’s 
children. 
 
13 
 
In which cases, if any, should the government allow non-essential motorized travel to 
continue? 
I take it that this type of travel should not be banned if its only effect is to 
damage a single child’s foreskin.  All the interests satisfied by non-essential 
motorized travel seem clearly sufficiently weighty to justify this degree of harm.  If 
so, then it is implausible to hold that a single child has a right-as-trump against MHE 
circumcision.  Indeed, even if we are confident that, statistically speaking, the 
pollution would kill one child if it were allowed to continue, I take it that the non-
essential motorized travel should be allowed to continue. 
On the other hand, if the pollution from the non-essential motorized travel 
were responsible for the deaths of 20% of society’s children, I take it that the 
government should ban this activity.  The aggregate harms involved are horrific, and 
the rights against such harms can therefore much more plausibly be held to have 
interest-trumping status.  
The intermediate case in which the pollution damages the foreskin of 50% of 
society’s boys such that they have to be subjected to MHE circumcision is more 
difficult to judge.  Nevertheless, I submit that the non-essential motorized travel 
should be permitted in this case.  The moral weight of all of the benefits generated by 
this travel seems sufficiently great to justify the negative consequences to the boys.  
Since the harms caused by Non-Essential Pollution are approximately as great as the 
harms caused by the practice of MHE circumcision in the United States,29 this 
example suggests that even the harms caused by the practice of MHE circumcision as 
a whole do not justify granting the rights against this practice an interest-trumping 
status. 
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The example of foreskin-damaging pollution is admittedly fanciful.  But it 
usefully highlights just how radical the right-as-trump view is.  As the example of 
pollution demonstrates, societies routinely accept fairly serious bodily harms (and 
even death) for individuals for the sake of sufficiently weighty aggregate social 
benefits.30  Only rights against the gravest and most numerous bodily harms reliably 
trump all competing interests in society.31  Insisting that children’s rights against 
moderate expected bodily harms are trumps would require drastic changes in society – 
changes that many of circumcision’s opponents would find difficult to countenance. 
Opponents of circumcision might respond by arguing that, while children’s 
rights against the practice of MHE circumcision may not have an interest-trumping 
status, these rights are sufficiently strong to clearly outweigh any interests set back by 
banning this particular practice.  They might even appeal to Non-Essential Pollution 
to support this position.  After all, even with all of the weighty interests that would be 
frustrated by a ban on non-essential motorized travel, Non-Essential Pollution seems 
like a difficult case to judge.  The strength of the children’s rights and the moral 
weight of the interests at stake are not orders of magnitude apart.  However, the 
interests that would be frustrated by a ban on circumcision seem nowhere near as 
weighty as the interests that would be frustrated by a ban on non-essential motorized 
travel.  It might therefore appear as though children’s rights against MHE 
circumcision, though not trumps, easily outweigh the competing interests. 
However, the interests sufficient to justify permitting MHE circumcision need 
not be nearly as weighty as those needed to justify Non-Essential Pollution for two 
reasons.  First, in Non-Essential Pollution, no competing rights are at stake.  In the 
case of MHE circumcision, on the other hand, there might plausibly be some religious 
or parental rights that would be infringed by a ban on the practice.  Second, as I shall 
15 
 
argue in the next section, the strength of children’s rights against the practice of MHE 
circumcision is substantially weaker than their rights against the foreskin-damaging 
pollution (despite the similarity of the harms).32  The reason, which I now turn to 
discussing, is the difference in the harmers’ motives. 
 
6. Non-Negligent Benevolence and the Strength of Rights 
The degree of harm is not the only relevant factor in determining the strength 
of rights.  I will argue in this section that the harmers’ motives matter as well and that 
a person has a weaker right against a non-negligently benevolent harm compared with 
an intentional harm.  This explains why the children’s rights against MHE 
circumcision are substantially weaker than their rights against the foreskin-damaging 
pollution.  
 
6.1 Motives, Expressive Wrongs, and the Strength of Rights 
To explore the relationship between motives and the strength of rights, 
consider the following case: 
Two Different Motives:  Two equally-sized, economically well-off 
groups of parents are currently planning to circumcise their sons. 
 
Parents in Group 1 intend to subject their sons to MHE circumcision in 
order to sell the foreskins to cosmetic companies for the parents’ profit, 
despite believing that the circumcision would moderately harm their 
sons in expectation. 
 
Parents in Group 2 subject their sons to MHE circumcision because 
they non-negligently believe it would be in their sons’ best interests to 
be circumcised.  The foreskins are discarded. 
 
The government views the practice of circumcision as harmful and is 
committed to banning it.  However, it only has the resources to prevent 
one group of parents from circumcising their children.   
 
Assume further that: 
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 The government can hold both groups of parents appropriately 
accountable for their actions after the fact. 
 
 The government can appropriately educate parents after the fact 
so that the children in Group 1 will be subjected future 
treatment no worse than children in Group 2. 
 
 The children will never find out how they were treated with 
regards to this circumcision. 
 
The government prevents the non-negligently benevolent 
circumcisions in Group 2 rather than the circumcisions in Group 1. 
 
If motives make no difference to the degree of badness, the government’s 
choice seems like the right one.  After all, the circumcisions are equally bad in terms 
of the consequences for the children.  But the circumcisions in the Groups 1 produce 
foreskins useful for the cosmetic companies while the foreskins in Group 2 
circumcisions are uselessly discarded.   
Yet I submit that the government’s choice here is mistaken.  If the government 
can only prevent one group of parents from circumcising their sons, I submit that it 
should prevent the circumcisions in Group 1.  If so, this suggests that motives can 
make one action worse than another, even if the harms are the same. 
One reason why bad motives may make harmful actions worse is because 
these motives constitute expressive wrongs – wrongs based on a certain type of 
disrespect exhibited by an agent for the individual affected by her actions.  Although 
he does not use the term ‘expressive wrong’, Warren Quinn describes this type of 
disrespect (in cases in which an agent harms another person as a means to the agent’s 
ends) as follows:  
The agent [who harms others as a means to his ends]… has something in 
mind for his victims – he proposes to involve them in some circumstance that 
will be useful to him precisely because it involves them.  He sees them as 
material to be strategically shaped or framed by his agency…  He must treat 
them as if they were then and there for his purposes. 33 
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In harming their children for their own financial gain, the parents in Group 1 treat 
their children as materials – there simply for the parents’ purposes.34  This grave 
expressive wrong makes the Group 1 circumcisions substantially morally worse and 
therefore more pressing to prevent than the circumcisions in Group 2.  Framed in 
terms of the rights of the harmed individuals, we can say that children have a stronger 
right against being circumcised as a means for generating parental profit compared 
with their right against being circumcised by non-negligently benevolent parents.   
Interestingly, German law currently permits circumcision only when this 
operation is motivated by the child’s well-being.35  This legal requirement of 
benevolence is consistent with the moral importance I am attributing to the harmer’s 
motives. 
However, some scholars explicitly object to this aspect of the German law 
and, more generally, to the claim that motives can affect an action’s badness or 
goodness.  As Merkel and Putzke write, ‘Wicked motives concern the morality of the 
parental actors.  As to justifying the violation of the child’s body, however, they do 
not even touch upon, let alone solve, the normative problem.’36  On Merkel and 
Putzke’s view (which is shared by many philosophers),37 motives, though certainly 
relevant for evaluating the moral character of a harming agent and her degree of 
blameworthiness, are irrelevant for ascertaining the degree of badness of a harmful 
action.  Parents who circumcise their sons’ for profit may well be particularly bad or 
blameworthy.  But the act itself is no morally worse and the child’s right against this 
act no stronger than in the non-negligent benevolence case. 
Merkel and Putzke do not address the counterintuitive implications of their 
view (of which there are many examples).38  Instead, they defend their position by 
arguing that the opposing view – the view that motives can affect the degree of an 
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action’s badness – has implausible implications.  The whipping of a child, they point 
out, is impermissible even when done by parents who believe it to be in their child’s 
best interests.  And a malevolent father who takes his son to a beneficial dentist 
appointment for the sole reason of watching his son writhe in pain is acting 
permissibly, they claim.39  If the permissibility-status of these actions is not affected 
by the parents’ motives, this seems to support the position that motives do not affect 
an action’s goodness or badness. 
I concede that Merkel and Puzke’s case judgments are compelling.  And I 
cannot hope to definitively refute their position that motives do not affect the degree 
of badness/goodness in this short section.  However, I shall respond to Merkel and 
Puzke by defending the following modest claim:  There is a plausible way of 
understanding the moral role of motives that 
a) allows motives to substantially affect an action’s degree of 
badness/goodness, 
 
b) is consistent with Merkel and Putzke’s compelling case judgments, 
 
c) is consistent with the judgment in Two Different Motives above, and 
 
d) can justify the government’s permitting non-negligently benevolent MHE 
circumcisions while banning intentionally harmful MHE circumcisions. 
 
It is admittedly difficult to see how motives can affect the badness of an action 
if the malevolent but beneficial dentist visit is permissible.  After all, the expressive 
wrong committed by the father is a heinous one and the benefit for the child is (we 
might assume) fairly minor.  If bad motives make an action worse, the badness of the 
expressive wrong in this case should easily outweigh the goodness of the minor 
benefits and thus make the father’s action impermissible. 
However, this difficulty only arises if we view the role of expressive wrongs 
additively.  We can instead understand their role multiplicatively – viewing them as a 
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magnifying/shrinking factor (a positive multiple) for the badness or goodness of an 
action.  On this magnifying-factor view of the role of expressive wrongs, very serious 
expressive wrongs act as large shrinking factors of the moral good of a beneficial 
action (while more modest expressive wrongs act as more modest shrinking factors).  
And for harmful actions, very serious expressive wrongs act as large magnifying 
factors (while more modest expressive wrongs act as low magnifying factors). 
The consistency of this magnifying-factor view with the judgments in the 
malevolent dentist visit and the benevolent whipping cases is not difficult to 
demonstrate.  A positive multiple cannot make a negative value positive nor can it 
make a positive value negative.  Thus, in the absence of competing considerations, the 
beneficial dentist visit cannot be made impermissible by the father’s malevolent 
motives.  The malevolent motives can only shrink the moral good of this action 
relative to a dentist visit motivated by a benevolent parent.  Similarly, in the absence 
of competing considerations, the harmful whipping cannot be made permissible by 
benevolent motives.  The benevolent motive can only shrink the degree of badness 
that the harmful whipping constitutes relative to whipping done, say, to simply vent 
the parents’ frustrations.  Thus, the magnifying-factor view grants an important role to 
expressive wrongs in determining an action’s overall goodness/badness while also 
being consistent with the impermissibility of the benevolent whipping and the 
permissibility of the malevolent dentist visit. 
The magnifying-factor view is also consistent with the judgment in Two 
Different Motives above.  The expressive wrong associated with non-negligent 
benevolent harming is clearly lower than the expressive wrong associated with 
harming an individual as a means to one’s end.  The parents in Group 2 do not see 
their children as mere materials for their purposes.  They are instead non-negligently 
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trying (though presumably failing) to make their children’s lives better.  The 
magnifying-factor view thus implies that the MHE circumcisions performed for the 
parents’ profit are substantially worse than MHE circumcisions authorized by non-
negligently benevolent parents and can therefore explain why the prevention of 
circumcisions in Group 1 should be prioritized over those in Group 2. 
Finally, the magnifying-factor view can justify permitting non-negligently 
benevolent circumcisions while banning malevolent circumcisions (in line with 
Germany’s approach).  Admittedly, in the absence of competing considerations, 
benevolent motives cannot make MHE circumcision permissible according to the 
magnifying-factor view.  Benevolent motives can only reduce the moral bad of MHE 
circumcisions relative to malevolent MHE circumcisions.  However, if there are 
weighty competing moral considerations (e.g., avoiding the departure of substantial 
number of religious citizens), motives can make a difference to the all-things-
considered permissibility of a practice.  The badness of non-negligently benevolent 
MHE circumcisions might be sufficiently shrunk such that it is outweighed by moral 
bad of the departure of the religious citizens.  Malevolent MHE circumcisions, on the 
other hand, might nevertheless have a badness greater than the badness of the 
departure of the religious citizens.  Thus, the magnifying-factor view can explain how 
the parents’ motives can affect whether the practice of MHE circumcision should be 
permitted, all things considered. 
 
6.2 Non-Essential Pollution vs. the Practice of MHE Circumcision  
Having provided a defense (albeit tentative) of the claim that harmers’ motives 
can affect the badness of actions, I now wish to compare the strength of children’s 
rights against the practice of MHE circumcision with the strength of their rights 
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against Non-Essential Pollution (assuming that the harms are equivalent).  This 
comparison is important for two reasons.  First, if children’s rights against the 
foreskin-damaging pollution are not trumps (as I argued above), and if the expressive 
wrongs associated with the practice of MHE circumcision are less severe than those 
associated with the foreskin-damaging pollution (as I shall argue in this section), this 
strongly suggests that children’s rights against the practice of MHE circumcision are 
not trumps, either.40  Second, as I shall argue in this section, the rights against the 
MHE circumcision are substantially weaker than the rights against the foreskin 
damaging pollution, then the plausibility that competing interests (e.g., avoiding the 
departure of religious citizens) can justify permitting the practice of MHE 
circumcision increases. 
Let us begin by considering the motives of the harmers in the two cases.  In 
the case of MHE circumcision, I argued above that parents are by and large motivated 
by non-negligent benevolence.  However, I conceded that a small minority may be 
harming their boys as a means to their ends (e.g., relieving pressure from religious 
relatives or protecting the father’s body image).41  In the case of the foreskin-
damaging pollution, on the other hand, all the boys are harmed as a byproduct of 
achieving the adults’ ends.42  Although the children’s foreskin is damaged as a 
foreseeable consequence of the motorized travel, this damage is not used as a means 
for producing this benefit.   
To compare the two practices, we must therefore compare the expressive 
wrongs from non-negligently benevolent harming, harming as a byproduct to one’s 
end, and harming as a means to one’s end.  To do so, let us consider a variation of 
Two Different Motives in which a third group of parents (which is also economically 
well-off) is added.  This group of parents wish to produce a good to sell for their own 
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pecuniary benefit.  However, the production of this good generates pollution that 
damages foreskins such that the children will need to be subjected to MHE 
circumcision.  The parents produce this good despite believing that the foreskin loss 
would moderately harm their sons in expectation. 
These parents’ actions seem morally abhorrent.  Although this action is not 
quite as bad as harming children as a means for profit, these actions are, I submit, far 
closer in terms of overall badness to those of the foreskin-selling parents than to those 
of the non-negligently benevolent parents.  This suggests that the expressive wrong 
associated with non-negligent benevolent harming is not only far less grave than the 
expressive wrong associated with harming another as a means to one’s end.  It is also 
substantially less grave than the expressive wrong associated with harming another as 
a byproduct of achieving one’s ends. 
Much of the literature on the moral consequences of motives has focused on 
the distinction between harming as a means and harming as a byproduct (this is the 
distinction at the heart of the well-known Doctrine of Double Effect).43  However, on 
the view I am defending here, this distinction is only one among many that affect the 
magnitude of expressive wrongs.  And it may not even be the most important one.  In 
this case, at least, the difference between non-negligent benevolent harming and 
intentional harming as a byproduct seems to dwarf the difference between intentional 
harming as a byproduct and intentional harming as a means. 
Given the nature of expressive wrongs, this judgment is unsurprising.  
Although the parents who harm their sons as a byproduct cannot be accused of 
treating their children as mere materials to be shaped by their agency, they 
nevertheless display a callous disregard for the well-being of their child.  Parents who 
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are non-negligently trying to benefit their children (but end up harming them 
nevertheless) treat their children’s lives with far greater respect.44   
 We can now see why children’s rights against the practice of MHE 
circumcision are substantially weaker than their rights against the foreskin-damaging 
pollution.  In the case of MHE circumcision, a large majority of boys are harmed by 
non-negligently benevolent agents while a small minority are harmed as a means to 
other agents’ ends.  In the case of the foreskin damaging pollution, all of the boys are 
harmed as a byproduct of achieving other agents’ goals.  If, as I have argued, the non-
negligently benevolent/intentional harm distinction makes a much greater difference 
to expressive wrongs than the byproduct/means distinction, then the children’s rights 
against the practice of MHE circumcision are indeed substantially weaker than their 
rights against being subjected to equivalently harmful pollution.  Thus, if children’s 
rights against the foreskin-damaging pollution are not trumps, the strength of their 
rights against MHE circumcision likely falls well short of an interest-trumping level.   
It is therefore not difficult to see how even a government sympathetic to the 
Nordic Ombudsmen for Children’s premises might nevertheless resist their calls to 
ban circumcision.  Even if the government agreed that the practice is harmful and 
infringes on children’s rights to bodily integrity, and even if the government agreed 
that the children’s rights are more weighty than any parental or religious rights to 
perform circumcision, it might nevertheless oppose a ban.  Since children’s rights in 
the case of MHE circumcision are priorities rather than trumps, competing social 
interests must be considered.  And sufficiently weighty social interests, such as those 
that would be set back by the departure of substantial numbers of Jewish and Muslim 
citizens, might well be sufficient to justify permitting the practice. 
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Conclusion 
 My aim in this article has been to explore the strength of pre-autonomous 
children’s right to bodily integrity.  Using the example of circumcision, I have argued 
that both the degree of expected harm and the degree of expressive wrong matter.  If a 
group of parents were castrating their sons, no realistic competing considerations 
would justify allowing the practice to continue, not even if the parents sincerely 
believed castration was beneficial.  And if parents were intentionally harming their 
children in more moderate ways for the parents’ personal benefit, such a practice, too, 
would be all but impossible to justify.   
However, cases like circumcision are more complex.  Even taking opponents’ 
empirical assumptions about the practice’s harms as given, circumcision is no more 
than moderately harmful in expectation.  And it is authorized by parents who, by and 
large, non-negligently believe that the procedure is in the best interests of their sons.  
In such cases, I have argued that the strength of children’s rights, even against the 
practice as a whole, falls well short of interest-trumping status.  Thus, not only 
competing rights, but also competing interests (e.g., those that would be set back by 
the departure of substantial numbers of religious citizens) will need to be considered 
in determining whether the practice should be permitted.  The debate cannot be settled 
by appeals to infringements on children’s rights to bodily integrity alone. 
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